In Stage 4, we model the decision process of two manufacturers as a sequential game when they adopt the same technology. In particular, the supplier first sets component wholesale price for this technology. The technology owner then decide on his order quantity. Finally, the other manufacturer decides on his order quantity.
A. Sequential Competition
In Stage 4, we model the decision process of two manufacturers as a sequential game when they adopt the same technology. In particular, the supplier first sets component wholesale price for this technology. The technology owner then decide on his order quantity. Finally, the other manufacturer decides on his order quantity.
A.1. Decisions from Stages 2 to 4 A.1.1. Scenario CC In this scenario, the analysis is identical to that in the base model.
Lemma S1 (Scenario CC). When both manufacturers close their technologies:
(i) if K ≥ 1/24, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CC s,2 = π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 0; (ii) if K < 1/24, the supplier invests in both technologies, π CC s,2 = 1/12 − 2K, and π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 1/48.
A.1.2. Scenarios OC and CO Due to symmetry, it suffices to consider Scenario OC, where only M 1 opens the technology. We derive the firms' profits on the basis of the supplier's investment decisions.
Case 1: supplier invests in neither technology. In this trivial case, every player receives zero profit: π OC s,2 = π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = 0. Case 2: supplier invests in only one technology. Clearly, the supplier prefers to invest in T 1 whose market size becomes A ≡ A + γ(1 − A) = γ + (1 − γ)A due to spillover. In Stage 4, given wholesale price w 1 , M 1 and M 2 engage in sequentially Cournot competition. As the technology owner, M 1 first decides on his order quantity, q 1 . Given q 1 , M 2 then decides on his order quantity with the profit function π OC m2,4 = ( A − q 1 − q 2 − w 1 )q 2 . Thus, M 2 's optimal order quantity in terms of q 1 and w 1 is q * 2 = A−q 1 −w 1 2 . Back to M 1 's order decision, he should maximize π OC m1,4 = ( A − q 1 − A−q 1 −w 1 2 − w 1 )q 1 and hence the optimal decision is q * 1 = A−w 1 2 . The resulting supplier's profit is π OC s,4 = 3w 1 ( A−w 1 ) 4 and her optimal decision is w * 1 = A 2 . In summary, the equilibrium order quantity are q OC m1,1 = A 4 , and q OC m2,1 = A 8 . Equilibrium profits are π OC s,4 = 3 A 2 /16, π OC m1,4 = A 2 /32, and π OC m2,4 = A 2 /64. By taking expectations with respect to A, the firms' Stage 2 expected profits are π OC s,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/16 − K, π OC m1,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/96, and π OC m2,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/192. Case 3: supplier invests in both technologies. In this case, since T 1 is open and the supplier has both supply capabilities, M 2 can adopt either T 1 or T 2 in Stage 3. Therefore, we analyze two subcases: (I) M 2 adopts T 1 ; (II) M 2 adopts T 2 . This case captures the available technology flexibility for a manufacturer when his competitor opens technology.
In Subcase (I), M 1 and M 2 engage in Cournot competition in T 1 's market, which has a total size of A due to spillover. The analysis is similar to Case 2, and the firms' Stage 4 profits are π OCI s,4 = 3 A 2 /16, π OCI m1,4 = A 2 /32, and π OCI m2,4 = A 2 /64. In Subcase (II), M 1 and M 2 each monopolize the market, of sizes A and 1 − A respectively, for their own technology. The analysis is similar to that of scenario CC, and the firms' Stage 4 profits are π OCII s,4 = A 2 /8 + (1 − A) 2 /8, π OCII m1,4 = A 2 /16, π OCII m2,4 = (1 − A) 2 /16. By comparing the two subcases, it is straightforward to show that M 2 will adopt T 1 if and only if A 2 /64 ≥ (1 − A) 2 /16 ⇔ A ≥ (2 − γ)/(3 − γ), namely, when T 1 is highly popular. We can then calculate the firms' Stage 2 expected profits:
With all three cases analyzed, we can determine the supplier's optimal technology investment decision in Stage 2. Define two thresholds for the supplier's investment cost:
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in Scenario OC (and by symmetry, CO, with the manufacturer indices swapped).
Lemma S2 (Scenario OC). When only M 1 opens technology:
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OC s,2 = π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = 0; profits on the basis of the supplier's investment decisions.
Case 1: supplier invests in neither technology. In this trivial case, every firm receives zero profits: π OO s,2 = π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 0. Case 2: supplier invests in only one technology. By symmetry, we can assume that the supplier invests in T 1 .
The analysis is similar to Scenario OC's Case 2, and the firms' Stage 2 expected profits are π OO s,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/16 − K, π OO m1,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/96, and π OO m2,2 = (1 + γ + γ 2 )/192. Case 3: supplier invests in both technologies. In this case, both manufacturers can freely adopt any technology. The manufacturers' technology choice equilibria in Stage 3 are shown in Table S1 , which presents the manufacturers' profits given their technology choices. 
Using the equilibria in Stage 3, we can then calculate the firms' expected profits in Stage 2:
With all three cases analyzed, we can determine the supplier's optimal decision on technology investment in Stage 2. Define three thresholds for this purpose on the supplier's investment cost:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal and equilibrium outcomes in Scenario OO.
Proposition S2 (Scenario OO).
When both manufacturers open their technologies:
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OO s,2 = π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 0;
, the supplier invests in only one technology, and π OO s,2
, the supplier invests in both technologies, and π OO s,2 = 1 12
A.2. Decisions in Stages 1
With subgame equilibria in Stages 2-4, we next derive the equilibria in Stage 1. Define β CC 1 (γ) = 1/24. First, note that β OC
Hence, we consider two cases: 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.1625 and 0.1625 < γ ≤ 1. 
B. Asymmetric Fixed Costs
In this section, we assume that the fixed costs of the two technologies are different. Denote by K 1 and K 2 the fixed costs of T 1 and T 2 , respectively. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
B.1. Decisions in Stages 2-4
Given players' decisions in Stages 1 and 2, the fixed costs do not affect the subsequent decisions and thus, the analysis of Stages 3 and 4 is the same as in the symmetric system (see Section 4).
Following the backward induction, we directly study supplier's decisions in Stage 2 under four scenarios CC, OC, CO, and OO. In Stage 2, the supplier has four feasible options, i.e., investing in neither, T 1 , T 2 and both technologies, denoted by Options Neither, T 1 , T 2 and Both, respectively.
Based on the analysis in the symmetric system, we can easily derive players' expected profits under four scenarios.
Table S3
Nash Game with 0.1625 < γ ≤ 1 under Sequential Game Scenario CC.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π CC s,2 = π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π CC s,2 = 1 24 − K 1 , π CC m1,2 = 1 48 , and π CC m2,2 = 0. • Option T 2 : π CC s,2 = 1 24 − K 2 , π CC m1,2 = 0, and π CC m2,2 = 1 48 . • Option Both: π CC s,2 = 1 12 − K 1 − K 2 , π CC m1,2 = 1 48 , and π CC m2,2 = 1 48 . Comparing supplier's expected profits under four options, we can determine supplier's optimal decision and accordingly, players' expected profits in Stage 2 under scenario CC.
Lemma S3 (Scenario CC). Suppose neither firm opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (i) if K 1 ≥ 1 24 , the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CC s,2 = 0, π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 0;
24 , then the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CC s,2 = 1 12 − K 1 − K 2 , π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 1 48 .
Scenario OC.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π OC s,2 = π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π OC s,2 = 1+γ+γ 2 18 − K 1 , and π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = 1+γ+γ 2 108 . • Option T 2 : π OC s,2 = 1 24 − K 2 , π OC m1,2 = 0, and π OC m2,2 = 1 48 .
Lemma S4 (Scenario OC). Suppose only M 1 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OC s,2 = 0, π OC m1,2 = 0, π OC m2,2 = 0;
Scenario CO.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π CO s,2 = π CO m1,2 = π CO m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π CO s,2 = 1 24 − K 1 , and π CO m1,2 = 1 48 , and π CO m2,2 = 0.
Lemma S5 (Scenario CO). Suppose only M 2 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CO s,2 = 0, π CO m1,2 = 0, π CO m2,2 = 0;
, the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CO s,2 = 1 12
24 , the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CO s,2 = 0, π CO m1,2 = 0, π CO m2,2 = 0; (ii) if K 1 < 1 24 and K 2 ≥ β CO 1 (γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π CO s,2 = 1 24 −K 1 , π CO m1,2 = 1 48 , π CO m2,2 = 0;
(iii) if K 1 < 1 24 and K 2 < β CO 1 (γ), the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CO s,2 = 1 12 + 37+40γ−20γ 2
Proof of Lemma S5. We first consider the case with K 2 − K 1 ≤ 1+γ+γ 2 18 − 1 24 . It implies that π CO s,2 ≥ π CO s,2 , i.e., the supplier will prefer investing in T 2 than T 1 provided that only one technology is invested. In other words, the supplier will never choose option T 1 . Then, the results are straightforward by comparing supplier's expected profits in three other scenarios. Now turn to the case with K 2 − K 1 > 1+γ+γ 2 18 − 1 24 . In this case, the supplier never chooses option T 2 . Comparing other options will lead to the following result.
. Thus, the conditions in (i) can be reduced to K 1 ≥ 1 24 . Furthermore, we can replace the conditions in (iii) with K 2 < β OC 3 (γ) and K 1 < 1 24 . Scenario OO.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π OO s,2 = π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 0.
Note that the supplier never chooses to open
Lemma S6 (Scenario OO). Suppose only M 1 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (a) when γ ≤ 1 2 , (i) if K 1 ≥ β OO 1 (γ), the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OO s,2 = 0, π OO m1,2 = 0, π OO m2,2 = 0;
(ii) if K 1 < β OO 1 (γ) and K 2 ≥ β OO 2 (γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π OO s,2 = 1+γ+γ 2 18 − K 1 , π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 1+γ+γ 2 108 ;
(iii) if K 2 < β OO 2 (γ), the supplier invests in both technologies, and π OO s,2 = 1 12 + 37+40γ−20γ 2 18(5−2γ
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OO s,2 = 0, π OO m1,2 = 0, π OO m2,2 = 0;
(ii) if K 1 < β OO 1 (γ) and K 2 ≥ β OO 3 (γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π OO s,2 = 1+γ+γ 2
, then the supplier invests in both technologies, and then π OO s,2 = 7+4γ+γ 2
B.2. Decisions in Stage 1
With subgame equilibria in stages 2-4, one can readily derive the equilibrium in Stage 1. The analysis is analogous to the symmetric system and thus omitted. The equilibria are illustrated by Figure 6 for the setting with γ = 1 2 . Figure S1 (a) and (b) illustrate the optimal decisions for the setting with γ = 1 3 and γ = 2 3 , respectively. 
Optimal decisions under asymmetric fixed costs with varying γ
C. Asymmetric Market Size
In this section, we assume that the future market sizes of two technologies are asymmetric. In particular, we assume that the demand of T 1 follows the Bernoulli 0-1 distribution, taking one with the probability α and zero with 1 − α. That is, only one technology emerges in the future market, while the other disappears. Without loss of generality, we assume α ≥ 1 2 .
C.1. Decisions in Stages 2-4
Note that given the realized demand, the analysis of stage 4 is the same as that in the basic model. Still following the backward induction, we first study the game in stages 2 and 3 under four scenarios.
Scenario CC.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π CC s,2 = π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π CC s,2 = α 8 − K, π CC m1,2 = α 16 , and π CC m2,2 = 0. • Option T 2 : π CC s,2 = 1−α 8 − K, π CC m1,2 = 0, and π CC m2,2 = 1−α 16 . • Option Both: π CC s,2 = 1 8 − 2K, π CC m1,2 = α 16 , and π CC m2,2 = 1−α 16 . Note that as α ≥ 1 2 , the firm prefers T 1 if determining to invest only one technology. Comparing supplier's expected profits under four options, we can determine her optimal decision and accordingly, players' expected profits in stage 2 under scenario CC.
Lemma S7 (Scenario CC). Suppose neither firm opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (i) if K ≥ α 8 , the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CC s,2 = 0, π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 0;
, the supplier invests in T 1 , and π CC s,2 = α 8 − K, π CC m1,2 = α 16 , π CC m2,2 = 0. (iii) if K < 1−α 8 , the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CC s,2 = 1 8 − 2K, π CC m1,2 = α 16 , π CC m2,2 = 1−α 16 .
Under scenario OC, the supplier always prefers T 1 to T 2 , if only one technology is invested in.
Therefore, we ignore the option of investing in T 2 .
• Option of Investing in Neither: π OC s,2 = π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = 0.
24
.
Lemma S8 (Scenario OC). Suppose only M 1 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (i) if K ≥ β OC 1 (α, γ), the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OC s,2 = 0, π OC m1,2 = 0 and π OC m2,2 = 0;
(ii) if β OC 2 (α, γ) ≤ K < β OC 1 (α, γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π OC s,2 = α+(1−α)γ 2 6 − K, π OC m1,2 = π OC m2,2 = α+(1−α)γ 2
36
; (iii) if K 2 < β OC 2 (α, γ), the supplier invests in both technologies, and π OC s,2 = α 6 + 1−α 8 − 2K, π OC m1,2 = α 36 , π OC m2,2 = α 36 + 1−α 16 .
• Option of Investing in Neither: π CO s,2 = π CO m1,2 = π CO m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π CO s,2 = α 8 − K, π CO m1,2 = α 16 , and π CO m2,2 = 0.
, and β CO 4 (α, γ) = 1−α 6 .
Lemma S9 (Scenario CO). Suppose only M 2 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (a) when 4(1 + αγ 2 ) ≥ 7α,
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CO s,2 = 0, π CO m1,2 = 0 and π CO m2,2 = 0;
, the supplier invests in only T 2 , and π CO s,2 = αγ 2 +(1−α)
, the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CO s,2 = α 8 + 1−α 6 − 2K, π CO m1,2 = α 16 + 1−α 36 , π CO m2,2 = 1−α 36 . (b) when 4(1 + αγ 2 ) < 7α, (i) if K ≥ β CO 2 (α, γ), the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CO s,2 = 0, π CO m1,2 = 0 and π CO m2,2 = 0;
(ii) if β CO 4 (a) ≤ K < β CO 2 (α, γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π CO s,2 = α 8 − K, π CO m1,2 = α 16 , π CO m2,2 = 0; (iii) if K < β CO 4 (α, γ), the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CO s,2 = α 8 + 1−α 6 − 2K, π CO m1,2 = α 16 + 1−α 36 , π CO m2,2 = 1−α 36 .
Scenario OO.
• Option of Investing in Neither: π OO s,2 = π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 0. • Option T 1 : π OO s,2 = α+(1−α)γ 2 6 − K, and π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = α+(1−α)γ 2
• Option Both: π OO s,2 = 1 6 − 2K, and π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 1 36 . Note that the supplier never choose to invest in T 2 if only one technology is invested in. Define
Lemma S10 (Scenario OO).
Suppose both manufacturers open their own technologies, then the supplier's optimal decision and players' optimal profits are given by (i) if K ≥ β OO 1 (α, γ), the supplier invests in neither technology, and π OO s,2 = 0, π OO m1,2 = 0 and π OO m2,2 = 0;
(ii) if β OO 2 (α, γ) ≤ K < β OO 1 (α, γ), the supplier invests in only T 1 , and π OO s,2 = α+(1−α)γ 2 γ) , then the supplier invests in both technologies, and then π OO s,2 = 1 6 − 2K, π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 1 36 .
C.2. Decisions in Stage 1
With subgame equilibria in Stages 2-4, we next derive the equilibria in Stage 1 by considering two cases: 4(1 + αγ 2 ) ≥ 7α, and 4(1 + αγ 2 ) < 7α. Again, we first fix γ = 1/2. Thus, the two cases become α ≤ 2/3 and α > 2/3. As α ≥ 1/2, one can easily prove that β OC
Thus, we consider these two subcases. Table S4 presents the payoff matrix of the Nash Game under different parameter regions for the subcase of 1/2 ≤ α < 3/5. After a simple comparison, we can obtain that the equilibrium is {XX, Case 2: α > 2/3. In this case, β OC Table S6 presents the payoff matrix of the Nash Game under different parameter regions. Similar to Case 1, after a simple comparison, we can obtain that the equilibrium is {XX, Neither} in region (i); {OX, T 1 } in region (ii); {CX, T 1 } in region (iii); {CO, Both} in region (iv); {CC, Both} in regions (v) and (vi).
In summary, the equilibria are illustrated by Figure 7 . Figure S2(a) and (b) illustrate the optimal decisions for the setting with γ = 1 3 and γ = 2 3 , respectively.
D. Game Equilibria with Outside Supplier
In this section, we assume there exists an outside supplier whose wholesale price is fixed and denoted by s. For convenience, we set γ = 1 2 and assume 1 2 ≤ s ≤ 2 3 .
D.1. Decisions in Stage 2-4
Following backward induction, we first derive the subgame equilibria given firms's decisions in Stage 1, i.e., under four scenarios: CC, OC, CO, and OO. 
Figure S2
Optimal decisions under asymmetric market sizes with varying γ D.1.1. Scenario CC. As the two technologies are symmetric, we take T 1 for example to investigate players' decisions in stages 3 and 4. 1 (α) • Option of Investing in Neither: If the supplier does not invest in T 1 , then she clearly gains zero profit from this technology market, i.e., π CC s,4 = 0. Moreover, M 1 has to order if profitable from the outside supplier with the wholesale price s. In particular, M 1 chooses the outside supplier if the realized market size is larger than s and accordingly, his profit can be expressed as π CC m1,4 (q 1 ) = (A − q 1 − s)q 1 ; otherwise, M 1 has to quit from market. Then, the optimal order quantity is q * 1 = A−s 2 and the optimal profit is π CC m1,4 = (A−s) 2 4 .
• Option of Investing in T 1 : As the supplier invested in the capacity of T 1 , M 1 has the option to order from the supplier or the outside supplier. By a similar analysis to the symmetric case, the supplier offers the wholesale price w CC 1 = A 2 . By assumption, s ≥ 1 2 ≥ A 2 , i.e., the wholesale price offered by the supplier is always less than that offered by the outside supplier. Therefore, M 1 always orders from the supplier. Given the realized market size, the optimal profits of the supplier and M 1 are π CC s,4 = A 2 8 and π CC m1,4 = A 2 16 , respectively. Now back to Stage 2. Supplier's expected profit from investing in one technology is E A [π CC s,2 ] = 1 24 . Clearly, if K is larger than 1 24 , the supplier invests in neither technology; otherwise, to invest in both technologies. 1 (α) Lemma S11. Suppose neither firm opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and firms' optimal profits are given by (i) if K ≥ 1 24 , the supplier invests in neither technology, and π CC s,2 = 0, π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = (1−s) 3 12 ; (ii) if K < 1 24 , the supplier invests in both technologies, and π CC s,2 = 1 12 − 2K, π CC m1,2 = π CC m2,2 = 1 48 .
D.1.2. Scenarios OC and CO. In this scenario, it is supposed that only one firm opens his technology, either F1 or F2. As the two technologies are homogenous, the two scenarios OC and CO are completely equivalent. Therefore, we only consider Scenario OC.
• Option of Investing in Neither: The supplier invests in neither technology and gains zero profit, i.e., π OC s,4 = 0. Moreover, both manufactures have to order from the outside supplier if profitable. As M 1 has already opened his technology, M 2 has the option to adopt T 1 or T 2 .
If M 2 adopts T 2 , then his profit is (S1)
• Option of Investing in One Technology: In this case, the supplier is supposed to invest in only one technology, T 1 or T 2 . Intuitively, the opened technology is more attractive for the supplier.
That is, the supplier will invest in T 1 instead of T 2 . Then, M 2 has the option to choose T 1 or T 2 , while M 1 sticks to T 1 . Note that both manufacturers never quit the market as they can always gain a positive profit if adopting T 1 . We first need to characterize M 2 's optimal decision in Stage 3, i.e., which technology to adopt.
If M 2 adopts T 1 , the two manufacturers compete in the T 1 market with the size of A. By the same analysis as the symmetric model, the supplier will offer the wholesale price w = A 2 which is less than s. It implies that manufacturers never choose the outside supplier. Accordingly, π OC m1,4 = π OC m2,4 = A 2 36 , and π OC s,4 = A 2 6 . If M 2 adopts T 2 , the manufacturers stand in their own markets. As the supplier only invests in T 1 , M 2 has to order from the outside supplier, while M 1 orders from the supplier. Note that β OC 1 (s) > β OC 2 (s). By comparing supplier's profits in (S1), (S2) and (S3), we can obtain supplier's decision in stage 2 as well as players' expected profits which are presented in the following lemma.
Lemma S12. Suppose only M 1 opens his own technology, then the supplier's optimal decision and firms' optimal profits are given by Note that β OO 1 (s) > β OO 2 (s) for any s ∈ [ 1 2 , 2 3 ]. By comparing supplier's profits in (S4), (S5) and (S6), we can obtain supplier's decision in stage 2 as well as players' expected profits which are presented in the following lemma.
Lemma S13. Suppose both manufacturers open technologies, then the supplier's optimal decision and firms' optimal profits are given by
, the supplier invests in neither technology, and then, π OO s,2 = 0, and π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 48s 2 −84s+37 432 ;
• if β OO 2 (s) ≤ K < β OO 1 (s), then the supplier invests in only T 1 , and then, π OO s,2 = 8s 3 −36s 2 +54s 243 − K, π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = −64s 3 +180s 2 −162s+63 972 ;
• if K < β OO 2 (s), then the supplier invests in both technologies, and then π OO s,2 = 37 288 − 2K, π OO m1,2 = π OO m2,2 = 37 1728 .
D.2. Decisions in Stage 1
Combing the results in Lemmas S11, S12 and S13, we can derive the equilibria in stage 1. Note 
